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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, d/b/a INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,

Plaintiff,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNET!',
FRANK WARNER and EUGENE
S. LAMBERT, COMMISSIONERS
OF THE PUBLIC SE RV I C E
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Case No.
12871

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In their brief, defendants have asserted a number of
"facts" unwarranted when the full record is examined.
Also, defendants ignore the Court's decision that there
are obvious factual and legal distinctions between traditional public utilities such as Mountain Bell and the protestant, Mobile. The facts supporting the Court's decision are as follows:
1.

I

Plaintiff relies on the Commission's Findings of
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Fact Nos. 4 through 13 (R. 920-22) which show a large
unfulfilled public need.
2. Mobile's two applications to the FCC for additional channels were both defective, and Mobile knew
they were defective at the time it filed them (R. 50-53,
56-57). In spite of the defects (notwithstanding defendants' claims of delay by the FCC), the FCC still granted
two additional channels to Mobile prior to June, 1970
(R. 922, Finding No. 13).
Mobile told the Commission in June, 1970 that
the two channels which it had been granted by the FCC
in May, 1970 would be in service "within thirty days or
sixty days" (R. 110). Mobile had still not placed these
additional channels in service more than one year later
at the conclusion of plaintiff's hearing before the Commission in June, 1971 (R. 922, Finding No. 13). It is
clear that the FCC has not prevented Mobile from providing additional service to the public.
3.

4. Harold Mordkofsky testified that Mobile's knowingly defective application to the FCC for the identical
channels which another person had just previously filed
for was a "strike" application (R. 511-516) which is an
illegal technique employed to block the granting of chan·
nels to another applicant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT'S DECISION FULLY DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED THE POINTS
URGED BY DEFENDANTS' PETITION.
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Defendants' petition repeats the same contentions
originally made to this Court in oral argument and appeal
brief. Defendants first assert that this Court was wrong
in determining that the Order of the Public Service Comwas arbitrary and capricious. They reject the
plain meaning of the Commission's own findings cited
in the Court's decision which findings show a large unfulfilled public need for mobile radio service. After reviewing and quoting the written findings of the Commission, the Court stated:
We cannot do other than agree that it seems
paradoxical for the Commission to make the findings just recited, particularly the emphasized portions, which indicate that there is an unfulfilled
public need for the proposed service, and then to
conclude the granting of the application would be
against the public interest.

It is submitted that the Commission's own specific
findings resolve this issue against defendants.
Defendants next argue that this Court failed to follow and apply the law of regulated monopoly. The decision fully discussed the question of monopoly under the
facts as found by the Commission and determined that
the need was for regulated competition and not monopoly.
The Court stated,
. . . in the instant situation the service to customers is over assigned wave-length air channels,
and it does not appear that either the factor of
duplication of expensive facilities, or the danger
of impairing or destroying the existing services is

4

as important as it is with respect to some other
utilities such as railroad and telephone mentioned )
above. In view of those facts, there should be
taken into consideration the sound principle which
pervades all business activity, that competition
is a wholesome and stimulating factor which tends
to further the objective to be desired mentioned
above: of assuring the public the best possible
service in the most economical and efficient man· 1
ner.
As one ground for their argument in favor of strict
monopoly, defendants malrn a number of unsubstantiated ,
statements about the nature and extent of Mobile's investments on page 17 of their petition. Those same assertions were answered in plaintiff's original brief as follows:
The Commission made no finding that Mobile
has long-term investments or that serious disrup·
tion would result to Mobile or to anyone else if
plaintiff were granted a certificate. In fact, the
Commission had just previously found on May 25,
1971, in another case that all of Mobile's investments were either "short-term" or "relatively
short-term" (Case No. 6359, Finding No. 6).
Moreover the Commission made no finding that
Mobile's market would be "seriously diluted" or ,
diluted at all by granting plaintiff's application.
Conspicuous by its absence from defendants' lengthy
citation of out-of-state authority on the issue of monop·
oly is the Utah case which discusses the question. This
Court, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service '
Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915, 918 (1943),
stated:
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The discretionary power granted the Commission
by the act, to grant or withhold certificates, negatives the idea that it was intended to grant and
maintain a monopoly in any field. The fact that
the act provides that the Commission may grant
a certificate when it determines that public conand necessity requires such services recogriizes that regulated competition is as much
within the provisions of the act as is regulated
monopoly. In the exercise of its powers to grant
or withhold certificates of convenience and necessity, questions of impairment of vested or property rights cannot very well arise. No one can
have a vested right to be free from competition,
to have a monopoly against the public. (Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
This Court's decision was based upon the Commission's own findings. In addition, the Court pointed out
that the Commission's Orders are not protected by a rule
of infallibility. Defendants have presented nothing new.
The Court's decision is correct. Defendants' petition for
re-hearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER P. FABER, JR.
WATKINS & FABER
606 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
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